Everyone is probably aware that bits do flip here and there in the supposedly rock-solid, predictable and deterministic hardware, but somehow every single data-management layer assumes that it's not its responsibility to fix or even detect these flukes.
Consider typical linux storage stack on a commodity hardware:
You have closed-box proprietary hdd brick at the bottom, with no way to tell what it does to protect your data - aside from vendor marketing pitches, that is.
Then you have well-tested and robust linux driver for some ICH storage controller.
I wouldn't bet that it will corrupt anything at this point, but it doesn't do much else to the data but pass around whatever it gets from the flaky device either.
Linux blkdev layer above, presenting /dev/sdX. No checks, just simple mapping.
Here things get more interesting.
I tend to use lvm wherever possible, but it's just a convenience layer (or a set of nice tools to setup mappings) on top of dm, no checks of any kind, but at least it doesn't make things much worse either - lvm metadata is fairly redundant and easy to backup/recover.dm-crypt gives no noticeable performance overhead, exists either above or under lvm in the stack, and is nice hygiene against accidental leaks (selling or leasing hw, theft, bugs, etc), but lacking authenticated encryption modes it doesn't do anything to detect bit-flips.Worse, it amplifies the issue.In the most common CBC mode one flipped bit in the ciphertext will affect a few other bits of data until the end of the dm block.Current dm-crypt default (since the latest cryptsetup-1.6.X, iirc) is XTS block encryption mode, which somewhat limits the damage, but dm-crypt has little support for changing modes on-the-fly, so tough luck.But hey, there is dm-verity, which sounds like exactly what I want, except it's read-only, damn.Read-only nature is heavily ingrained in its "hash tree" model of integrity protection - it is hashes-of-hashes all the way up to the root hash, which you specify on mount, immutable by design.
Block-layer integrity protection is a bit weird anyway - lots of unnecessary work potential there with free space (can probably be somewhat solved by TRIM), data that's already journaled/checksummed by fs and just plain transient block changes which aren't exposed for long and one might not care about at all.
Filesystem layer above does the right thing sometimes.btrfs was slow as hell on rotating plates last time I checked, but zfs port might be worth a try, though if a single cow fs works fine on all kinds of scenarios where I use ext4 (mid-sized files), xfs (glusterfs backend) and reiserfs (hard-linked backups, caches, tiny-file sub trees), then I'd really be amazed.
Other fs'es plain suck at this. No care for that sort of thing at all.
Above-fs syscall-hooks kernel layers.
IMA/EVM sound great, but are also for immutable security ("integrity") purposes ;(In fact, this layer is heavily populated by security stuff like LSM's, which I can't imagine being sanely used for bitrot-detection purposes.Security tools are generally oriented towards detecting any changes, intentional tampering included, and are bound to produce a lot of false-positives instead of legitimate and actionable alerts.
Plus, upon detecting some sort of failure, these tools generally don't care about the data anymore acting as a Denial-of-Service attack on you, which is survivable (everything can be circumvented), but fighting your own tools doesn't sound too great.
There is tripwire, but it's also a security tool, unsuitable for the task.
Some rare discussions of the problem pop up here and there, but alas, I failed to salvage anything useable from these, aside from ideas and links to subject-relevant papers.
So, naturally, following long-standing "... then do it yourself" motto, introducing fs-bitrot-scrubber tool for all the scrubbing needs.
It should be fairly well-described in the readme, but the gist is that it's just a simple userspace script to checksum file contents and check changes there over time, taking all the signs of legitimate file modifications and the fact that it isn't the only thing that needs i/o in the system into account.
Main goal is not to provide any sort of redundancy or backups, but rather notify of the issue before all the old backups (or some cluster-fs mirrors in my case) that can be used to fix it are rotated out of existance or overidden.
Don't suppose I'll see such decay phenomena often (if ever), but I don't like having the odds, especially with an easy "most cases" fix within grasp.
If I'd keep lot of important stuff compressed (think what will happen if a single bit is flipped in the middle of few-gigabytes .xz file) or naively (without storage specifics and corruption in mind) encrypted in cbc mode (or something else to the same effect), I'd be worried about the issue so much more.
Wish there'd be something common out-of-the-box in the linux world, but I guess it's just not the time yet (hell, there's not even one clear term in the techie slang for it!) - with still increasing hdd storage sizes and much more vulnerable ssd's, some more low-level solution should materialize eventually.
Here's me hoping to raise awareness, if only by a tiny bit.